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KANT AND THE NOUMENAL AGENT 




Immanuel Kant's position on free will is creative but contro­
versiaL Itgives empirical science its due by asserting that everything 
innature is bound by the law of causation - thus, it posits determin­
ism; yet italso allows us to think of ourselves as moral agents, capable 
of acting autonomously - thus, it also posits freedom. It allows us 
the best of both worlds; however, it poses many difficult problems. 
The idea of an agent outside space and time - a noumenal agent­
is an element that can be particularly difficult to tangle with. Just 
how does the noumenal agent work outside - or within - the law 
of causation? How does the noumenal agent relate to the phenom­
enal being? These questions mustbe dealt with in order to assess the 
viability of Kant's doctrine. 
According to Kant, we can be both free and causally deter­
mined. He esc apes contradiction by saying tha t we are not free in the 
same sense in which we are determined; we are transcendentally 
free, and empirically determined: II • •• natural necessity is referred 
merely to appearances and freedom merely to things in themselves" 
\nQ!S:gQw~ 343-44). As rational beings, we have a sensible char­
acter that is determined by the laws of causation, but we also have an 
intelligible character underlying it, which Kant says is a thing in 
itself, a noumenon \-,=~~~B 569). Things in themselves are not in 
time, since time is just our own form of sensible intuition; thus, they 
cannot be bound in the chain of causal events, which always occur in 
time. 
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One peril of this position (as suggested, in conversation, by 
Len Clark) is that if one isn't careful, one might begin talking about 
our phenomenal versus noumenal selves. It is easy shorthand, butis 
dangerous, because to talk of two selves smacks of Cartesian dual­
ism. It leads to the obvious objection that Kant's rational being is not 
a unified subject, but is really two separate entities altogether. This 
is bad exegesis as well as bad metaphysics. First, Kant certainly 
didn't intend to posit two separate selves in this manner. The 
rational being is a unified subject that "can be regarded from two 
points of view" (Critique B 566). There is a sense in which we are 
phenomena, belonging to the wodd of appearance, and a sense in 
which we are noumena, belonging to the world of things in them­
selves. Second, to misinterpret Kant this way opens him to unde­
served criticism over the supposed lack of unity inhis view of the self. 
Allen W. Wood suggests that this "two-worlds" view does not allow 
us to think of ourselves as unified (Wood 75). He notes tha t "Norman 
Kretzmann has commented ... that this may be likened to saying lha t 
a married couple is compatible, but only as long as they live in 
separate houses" (Wood 75). When looked at in this way, it seems as 
though Kant is cheating, but I disagree with Wood and Kretzmunll. 
Kant wants to say that our phenomenal and noumenal characters 
belong to different worlds (which are really not so much different 
worlds as different ways of regarding the world), but are indeed 
unified. They are not two entities linked by some mystical silver 
cord; they are two aspects of the same entity, two ways of regarding 
the subject. 
I refer throughout this essay to the intelligible character of 
which Kant speaks as the "noumenal agent." This language is not 
Kant's. However, I think it is justifiable. Kant does refer to the 
intelligible character as a nomnenon (469). And it is this intelligible 
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character which can be considered free in action. Kant refers to it as 
the intelligible aspect of an "acting subject" (Critique B 567). There­
fore, it is fair to call it an agent. Keep in mind, however, that I mean 
lithe aspect of an agent which is noumenal." I don't mean that all 
people are made up of two agents, a noumenal and a phenomenal 
agent. For this would be like the dualism which I rejected earlier. 
What is it, then, about this subject that permits it to be free 
even though causation is necessary and universal? Causation is 
always in time, according to the Second Analogy. Butour intelligible 
character is not in time, since time is a form of our sensible intuition. 
Therefore, our intelligible cilaracter stands apart from the chain of 
causation that determines our sensible character; in the respect that 
we are intelligible, we are free. 
But what does the intelligible character have freedom to do? 
If the noumenal aspect of the self can only be free in the noumenal 
world, completely apart from anything that happens to the phenom­
enal aspect, then wha Lis the point of discussing it at all? If there were 
no interaction betwp-en the noumenal agent and the phenomenal 
world, then we could not describe any of our phenomenal actions as 
free. Since the phenomenal world is the world in which we live, it is 
there that we want to be able to talk of our actions as being free. Thus, 
we must say that somehow our noumenal freedom is expressed in 
the phenomenal world. 
In fact, that is what Kant says. writes, lithe active being 
[i.e. the noumenal agent] of itself begins its effects in the sensible 
world" (Critique B 569). There is an interaction, although the exact 
mechanics of this are obscure - as is reasonable, since we are 
discussing noumena, about which we have to be very careful what 
we say. 
Time is an a priori form of all our sensible intuition. It 
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applies, therefore, only to things in the phenomenal world. So the 
noumenal agent must be outside time. Yet the sensible world is 
always in time. So the agent outside time must be having an effect 
on things which are in time. The idea of the noumenal agent 
outside of time having an effect on events in time carries several 
problems with it. First, just how can it "cut in" to the chain of 
causal events, since these causal events will always follow uni­
versal rules? If I can follow a chain of events backward in time all 
the way to my birth and explain everyone of my actions by 
pointing to something that happened in the phenomenal world, 
then how can I claim that my intelligible character had any choice 
in the matter at all? 
Since noumena somehow - although we cannot know how 
- underlie phenomena, one wa y to explain this is to take the posi tion 
that our intelligible character creates a complete causal history that 
enables us to make the decisions that we make in our lives (Wood 91­
92). 
Let's consider a woman named Jennifer for example. Jennifer 
makes a moral decision which involves donating a sum of money to 
an organization which fights against racism. Now, insofar as she is 
intelligible, }em1ifer made this decision freely. However/ insofar as 
she is sensible, we must be able to explain her action causally. So we 
discover that Jennifer is very tolerant of other races and very much 
against racism. We can explain this causally/ too: Jennifer was raised 
by her parents to be very tolerant. J €lmifer' s parents raised her that 
way because they were strongly affected by the Holocaust. 
Now/ since we can explain Jennifer's decision completely 
through causation in the sensible world/ how can we explain the 
connection that her intelligible freedom has to her decision? One 
way is to say that her noumenal aspect ordered the phenomenal 
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world insuch a way that allowed her to make the decisions which she 
made. She created a world in which she was able to have the beliefs 
she had and perform the actions she performed according to the laws 
of causation. 
The trouble with this is readily apparent. The Holocaust 
seems to be an essential partofthe causal history leading to Jennifer's 
decision. Does that mean that Jennifer created the Holocaust, and is 
responsible for it? 
Critics of Kant contend just that, and say this model has 
disastrous consequences. Jonathan Bennett holds that in this waywe 
could possibly be responsible for such things as the Holocaust, 
although we don't realize it, because our noumenal aspects made a 
choice about our life which has the Holocaust as an indIrect but 
necessary causal condition. If true, this would undermine Kant's 
theory considerably, he is trying to construct a model in which 
we could think of ourselves as being responsible for our own actions. 
If we never knew what actions and events we were or were not 
responsible for, the theory would he relatively useless. 
Since the Holocaust involved the moral choices of other 
noumenal agents, who are free and autonomous, it does not seem 
possible that they could have been determined bya differentnoumenal 
agent in this manner. If I personally were responsible for the 
Holocaust, that would mean that the moral decisions of a lot of Nazis 
would have been caused by me. But the noumenal agent "begins its 
effects in the sensible world," not the intelligible world B 
569). Kant would not allow us to say that we determined the 
noumenal choices of other subjects. 
It is less clear how Kant could respond to the idea that I 
caused, for example, an earthquake due to my noumenal choices. 
Let's say this time that Jennifer is a very stingy person and will not 
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give money to charity. That's because when Jennifer was growing 
up, her family was impoverished and needed to save whatever it 
had. Her family's impoverishment was due to an earthquake which 
destroyed their home. So, in deciding not to give money to charity, 
is Jennifer responsible for the earthquake that allowed the causal 
series necessary for her to make that decision? Since it involves a 
sensible object that has a noumenal character but no noumenal 
agency, it is not contradictory like the Nazi example. However, Kant 
still would not want us to be held responsible for destructive forces 
of nature. He only wants us to be responsible for our own actions. 
This is a problem for Kant, but only so long as we continue to 
speculate about how noumena underlie phenomena. But Kant 
intended us to do no such speculation. After ali, noumena are things 
which are not an object of sensible intuition. Since we have no 
intuition other than sensible, we cannot learn of them through 
intuition. We are allowed to make certain assumptions about them, 
but only when practical reason is at stake. We need to leave the door 
open to freedom .in order to permit morality in any reasonable form. 
We do not need to know the exact mechanics of that freedom. Our 
difficulty comes from asking questions which should not rightly be 
asked. Things in themselves are l.mknowablei we can speak nega­
tively of them (they are not determined in time), but we should be 
wary of saying anything strongly positive about them (they cause 
phenomenal events). Kant does assert the latter (Critique B 569), but 
in a mild way. We must have some idea that they have effects in the 
sensib Ie world, or else the theory o.f freedom is useless, as mentioned 
previously. However, we should not even try to map out just how 
they accomplish these effects. That would be ont of bounds; we 
would be going beyond the practical interest of reason. 
One may rightly question the fairness of building a theory on 
20 HEATHER M. KENDRICK 
a cornerstone that one is not allowed to ask certain questions about. 
However, if one accepts the distinction behveen noumena and 
phenomena - and I am not in a position to argue for this distinction 
in this paper - then one should recognize the validity of what Peter 
Suber (in conversation) has called the "shut up!" defense. Kant is 
only trying to show that the ideas of free will and natural necessity 
are not automatically contradictory: he writes, "What we have been 
able to show, andwhat we have alone beenconcerned to show, is that 
... causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature" 
(Critique B 586). The question of whether we can be held responsible 
for the Holocaust does not disprove Kant's assertion that freedom 
and nahl ~al necessity are noncontradictory. It poses a question that 
involves the working of noumena, something about which we can­
not know. 
Wooduses an analogy that I find very appropriate to describe 
what Kant is doing (Wood 83). Just as, in our court system, a man is 
innocent until proven guilty, free will should be assumed to exist 
unless it is proven otherwise. Why should we assume the existence 
of f"~e will? We have a couple of good reasons. The first, as 
mentioned by Wood, is that morality presupposes freedom, and so 
maintaining the plaUSibility of freedom is essential for explaining 
how we can talk about morality jn rational beings. The second, which 
Wood did not mentionbut which is equally important, is that we are 
always assuming that we have freedom. We always act under that 
presupposition. It is so integral to our thinking that if we deny it, we 
had better have an extremely strong argument for doing so. 
As in the courtroom the burden of proof is on the prosecution, 
in this case, the burden of proof is on those who would deny free will. 
Kant needs only inh'oduce a reasonable doubt (Wood 84). If freedom 
contradicted the fact of necessary causation, then we would prob­
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ably be justified in denying freedom. However, although there are 
things left unaccounted for (and rightfully so, as they are noumenal 
issues), Kant shows that we are at least not being contradictory to 
assert the existence of both. This lack of contradiction is enough to 
introduce the "reasonable doubt." 
The noumenal subject as timeless agent brings with it more 
problems than just the question of how noumenal events determine 
the phenomenaL As Wood points out, since our noumenal aspect is 
not in time, as noumenal agents, one might say that we must make 
all of our decisions at once - "all in a lump." 
This leaves us floundering when we try to account for change 
in moral character. Our noumenal decisions are not made through 
time; so they must be made all at once (or so the criticism goes). 
Noumena are not in time, and thus are unchanging. This makes it 
puzzling to consider how some people start out as decent people and 
end up becoming immoral, or how some people are crooked but 
through some effort manage to better themselves. Somehow, such 
people mllst make a nOll menal choice to be strangely morally incon­
sistent, and that is difficult to understand. 
Closely related to tha tis the idea tha tit is useless for one to try 
to improve himself (Wood 97). All our choices are presumably made 
in a lump, so the idea of striving to become a better person over time 
seems worthless. But I believe Kant wouldhave wanted people to try 
to become more Illoral over time. This seems like a flaw in Kant's 
theory. 
I bel ieve that these two problems are based on an inaccurate 
premise, i.e. if choices are not made through time, then they must be 
made "all at once." We cannot talk about things happening "all at 
once" in the noumenal world - there is no such thing as coexistence 
in the noumenal world. So how do we make our choices in the 
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noumenal world, if they are neither through time nor simultaneous? 
Well, that is a dangerous question, as itventures into territory thatwe 
can't say a whole lot about. The question asks us to discuss some­
thing of which we have no conception - timelessness. 
Perhaps the most damning is the idea that, since we have 
already made all of our noumenal choices, we are not really free 
anymore, having been determined already by our own noumenal 
choices (Wood 96). The criticism holds that if we could examine all 
the factors involved, we could predict with certainty that we would, 
e.g., tell a lie on November 2. It implies a rather disturbing fatalism. 
Again, my criticism of the 1/all at once" idea stands, because it implies 
some sort of phenomenal relation. It doesn't make a lot of sense to 
say that one has "already" made noumenal choices since "already" 
implies a time relation that does not exist in the noumenal world. But 
I have a more specific answer to this position: even if we are 
determined in this way, we are determined by our own choices, 
which is a sort of freedom - autonomy. If we determine ourselves, 
then it means we are not being determined by outside, or heterono­
mous, influences. IIAutonomy of the will is that property of it by 
which it is a law to itself [emphasis mine] .. ," (Foundations 440) It's 
a rather counterintuitive explanation, since the idea of acting under 
rules even if they are our own rules -. seems to go against the 
conception of freedom that some people have, but it still allows for 
the core of morality, which is that we are responsible for our own 
actions. Even if it were true that at a certain point I could analyze 
every relevant cause and discover that at a certain point I would tell 
a lie, I don't think that would be grounds to reject Kan.t' s position. rill 
willing to accept that brand of autonomy. Admittedly, it would be 
an unpleasant and strange situation if I really did know I was going 
to tell a lie on Nov. 2,but fortunately we do nothave the ability to take 
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into account everything we would need to in order to discover that 
outcome. SO, to me, it is irrelevant whether itis theoretically possibIe 
or not. 
Kant's doctrine of freedom can be difficult to deal with, 
particularly the idea of the noumenal, timeless agent. It is an unusual 
way of looking at our place in the world, but it still allows us to hold 
common-sense beliefs about morality, while it also takes empirical 
science into account. The trouble that people run into when criticiz­
ing Kant's position is due to their attempting to ask questions about 
noumena that should not be asked, and trying to attribute phenom­
enal qualities to noumena. 
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